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| Registros recuperados: 13 | |
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| Moretto, Michele; Rossini, Gianpaolo. |
| One of the main reasons why workers enterprises (WE) still represent a relevant chunk of the economy may lie in some affinities with conventional profit maximizing firms. To prove this, we compare the entry policies of WEs and conventional firms when they can decide size at entry while having to stick to it afterwards. Even though short run differences remain, a long run coincidence appears besides that under certainty. Endogenizing size and time of entry in an uncertain dynamic environment we see that WEs enter at the same trigger and size of conventional firms. Both of them wait less and choose a dimension larger than the minimum efficient scale. This may be another way to explain why WE are still an important share of the economy (Hesse and Cihàk,... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9334 |
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| Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele. |
| We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits; Public Economics; L51; D44; D92. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50409 |
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| Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele. |
| We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model where firms must report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the concession fee paid to the government. Two bidding rules are considered in this paper. One rule consists of awarding the concession to the firm that reports the lowest price. The other consists of granting the franchise to the bidder offering the highest fee. We compare the outcome of these rules with reference to two alternative concession arrangements. The former imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to roll-out the service. The latter allows the concessionaire to optimally decide the investment timing. The focus is on the effect of bidding rules and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Bidding Rules; Managerial Flexibility; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; L51; D44; D92. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6630 |
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| Moretto, Michele; Dosi, Cesare. |
| We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model where firms report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the concession fee paid to the government. Two alternative bidding rules are considered in this paper. One rule consists of awarding the exclusive right of exercise to the firm that reports the lowest price. The other consists of granting the franchise to the bidder offering the highest fee. We compare the outcome of these rules with reference to two alternative concession arrangements. The former imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to roll-out the service. The latter allows the winning bidder to optimally decide the investment time. The focus is on the effect of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12196 |
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| Moretto, Michele; Valbonesi, Paola. |
| To avoid high profit levels often experienced in countries where monopolies in public utility sectors are regulated through price-cap mechanisms, several regulatory agencies have recently introduced profit-sharing (PS) clauses aimed at obtaining price reductions to the benefit of consumers. However, the implementation of these PS clauses has often turned out to be severely con- trained by the incompleteness of the price-cap itself and the non-verifiability of firmsprofits. This paper studies the properties of a second-best optimal PS mechanism designed by the regulator to induce the regulated monopolist to divert part of its profits to custormers. In a dynamic model where a reg- ulated monopolist manages a long-term franchise contract and the regulator... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Financial Economics. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12202 |
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| Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele. |
| Exclusive rights granted by public authorities, like concessions to develop natural resources or electromagnetic spectrum licences, often have option-like features. However, to avoid licences being unused for lengthy periods, regulators sometimes set time limits, after which the exclusive right of exercise may be revoked. In this paper we analyse the impact of use or lose ("UOL") provisions upon the private time of investment. We find that the risk of losing the licence because of inaction generally increases the probability of early investment. However, when capital costs are expected to decline over time, UOL provisions may involve a "perverse effect", by increasing, rather than reducing, the expected time of investment, with respect to a situation where... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Licences; Real Options; Use or Lose Provisions; Time of Investment; Financial Economics; L51; D44; D92. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59756 |
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| Moretto, Michele; Vergalli, Sergio. |
| Recent European Legislation on immigration has revealed a particular paradox on migration policies. On the one hand, the trend of recent legislation points to the increasing closure of frontiers (OECD 1999, 2001,2004), also by using immigration quotas. On the other hand, there is an increase of regularization, i.e., European policies are becoming less tight. Our aim here is to study these counterbalanced and opposite policies in European immigration legislation in a unified framework . To do this, we have used a real option approach to migration choice that assumes that the decision to migrate can be described as an irreversible investment decision where quotas represent an upper bound limit. Our results show that the paradox of counterbalancing... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Immigration; Real Option; Quota System; F22; J61; O15; R23. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37818 |
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| Moretto, Michele; Vergalli, Sergio. |
| This paper tries to explain why most migration flows show some observable jumps in their processes, a phenomenon that seems to be sympathetic with the characteristic of irreversibility of migration. We present a real option model where the choice to migrate depends on both the differential wage between the host country and the country of origin, and on the probability of being fully integrated into the host country. The theoretical results show that the optimal migration decision of a single individual consists of waiting before migrating in a (coordinate) mass of individuals. The dimension of the migration flow depends on the behavioural characteristics of the ethnic groups: the more "sociable" they are, the larger the size of the wave and the lower the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Labor and Human Capital. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12071 |
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| Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo. |
| The paper studies the incentive for providers to invest in new health care technologies under alternative payment systems, when the patients' benefits are uncertain. If the reimbursement by the purchaser includes both a variable (per patient) and a lump-sum component, efficiency can be ensured both in the timing of adoption (dynamic) and the intensity of use of the technology (static). If the second instrument is unavailable, a trade-off may emerge between static and dynamic efficiency. In this context, we also discuss how the regulator could use the control of the level of uncertainty faced by the provider as an instrument to mitigate the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Finally, the model is calibrated to study a specific technology. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Health Care; Investments; Health Economics and Policy; I18; D92. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/98047 |
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| Registros recuperados: 13 | |
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